

PERSIAN STRATEGY AGAINST EGYPT AND THE DATE FOR THE BATTLE OF CITIUM

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SOMETIME IN THE EARLY YEARS of the fourth century Evagoras of Cyprus began (or was forced into) a prolonged revolt from the Persian empire. The chronology of this revolt and of its main events is disputed and may be beyond recovery. The only full ancient narrative that we have comes from Diodorus of Sicily, and is manifestly tangled. Scattered passages in his narrative claim that the revolt began in 391/90 (Diod. 14.98.3), lasted very nearly ten years, and ended in 385/4 (Diod. 15.9.2). Something is wrong, if only with Diodorus' arithmetic. Isocrates (*Paneg.* 140–141) provides information which only adds to the confusion. He says that at the time of writing the war in Cyprus was unfinished after six years and mentions a little-known Persian assault on Egypt of three years' duration, apparently as a preliminary to the assault on Cyprus. Unfortunately the date for the *Panegyricus* itself is disputed, but ca 380 has seemed best to many scholars and, despite some serious problems, must be accepted. Progress has been made recently on the dates of the commencement and termination of the revolt thanks to a thorough study of the question by Christopher Tuplin.¹ In the present study, his article is taken as read and the dates of ca 390 for the outbreak of the revolt and ca 380 for its conclusion are accepted. The principal concern here is with the events between those dates, particularly the battle of Citium, which marked the start of all-out hostilities between Evagoras and Persia, and the Great King's "three-year"

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¹C. J. Tuplin, "Lysias XIX, the Cypriot War and Thrasyboulos' Naval Expedition," *Philologus* 127 (1983) 170–186, especially 178. A select bibliography: W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* (Marburg 1892) 152–155; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* (Stuttgart 1958) 308–309; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 3^{2.2} (Berlin 1923) 121–126; C. I. Reid, "Ephoros Fragment 76 and Diodoros on the Cypriote War," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 123–143, argues for significantly earlier dates; S. Ruzicka, "Clazomenae and Persian Foreign Policy," *Phoenix* 37 (1983) 104–108; P. J. Stylianou, "How Many Naval Squadrons Did Athens Send to Evagoras?," *Historia* 37 (1988) 463–471; in general, D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia: Lectures Delivered at the University of Cincinnati, Autumn 1976 in Memory of Donald W. Bradeen* (Leiden 1977) 136–158. The above works will be cited by author's name alone. On the date of the *Panegyricus* see Tuplin 180.

invasion of Egypt. I wish to argue here that questions of strategy and logistics have been overlooked in the debate over the correct dates for these events so far. Under the circumstances of the 380s a Persian assault on Egypt would not have been possible strategically without the prior reduction or neutralization of Cyprus. In that case the attack on Egypt must have followed, or must at least have been simultaneous with, the invasion of Cyprus. Isocrates must be wrong, therefore, or perhaps he has been misread.

It will be useful to tabulate the suggested chronology. The chronology for the events for the period 387–383/2 is mine; that of the others is, or follows from, Tuplin's.

- 390 The King determines that Evagoras' attempts to subdue the whole island of Cyprus are acts of revolt and orders a fleet to be built and Hecatomnus of Caria to take it and attack Evagoras. Evagoras negotiates an alliance with Athens.
- 390/89 Hecatomnus crosses to Cyprus "with a large force," but ends up supporting Evagoras secretly with cash (Diod. 14.98.4, 15.2.3).
- 390/89 Thrasybulus of Athens operates at Eurymedon and Aspendus in support of Evagoras and is killed (Diod. 14.99.4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24).
- 387/6 The King dictates peace terms for Greece to Antalcidas, aiming to settle Greek affairs to enable him to attack Cyrus and Egypt. Pharnabazus goes to Susa to marry the King's daughter and receive the Egyptian command (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28; Plut. *Artax.* 27.7; Justin 6.6; Diod. 15.29.1).
- 387/6 Late spring/summer: the Battle of Citium, which Evagoras loses (Diod. 15.3; Theopompus F 103.5–7). Late summer?/autumn: the invasion of Egypt under Pharnabazus (Isoc. *Paneg.* 140–141).
- 386? Late(?): Evagoras goes to Egypt in quest of money, but returns with a disappointing amount. (Diod. 15.4.3, 8.1).
- 385/4 After two years of fighting Evagoras has lost all of Cyprus and is under siege; he begins negotiating with Tiribazus for terms of surrender (15.8.2). Tiribazus' terms are harsh and Evagoras and Orontes combine to denounce Tiribazus to Artaxerxes, who responds with instructions for Orontes to arrest Tiribazus (Diod. 15.8.3–9.2; Theopompus F 103.9).
- 384/3 Glos, Tiribazus' son-in-law, revolts, taking units of the Persian navy and depriving Pharnabazus of needed support from the sea (Diod. 15.9.3–5). Pharnabazus withdraws from Egypt after an unsuccessful campaign of three years, 386–384 by inclusive reckoning (Isoc. *Paneg.* 141).
- 383 The King, invading the land of Cadusians, is unable to hear the trial of Tiribazus (Diod. 15.8.5; Plut. *Artax.* 24; Theopompus F 103.9–11).
- ca 383/2 The trial and acquittal of Tiribazus after the Cadusian campaign, and the fall of Orontes (Diod. 15.10).

ca 381/0 Evagoras, fearing the worst, sends ambassadors to Sparta belittling the King's effectiveness in the Egypt-Cyprus campaigns and requesting aid (Isoc. *Paneg.* 135; Theopompus F 103.10); Isocrates completes the *Panegyricus*, describing the Egyptian and Cyprian campaigns in terms that were probably influenced by the reports of Evagoras' ambassadors. Meanwhile, Evagoras negotiates favourable conditions and capitulates after the accession of Nectenibis in Egypt (Diod. 15.9.1-2; Theopompus F 103.9-11).

I argue that the simultaneity of the campaigns on Cyprus and in Egypt is required by considerations of military strategy. Some historical background will put the military options of both Evagoras and Persia into perspective. There was a Cyprian contingent in the King's fleet before the battle of Cnidus (394). Xenophon breaks this fleet down into two divisions, the Phoenician, commanded by Pharnabazus, and the Hellenic, commanded by Conon (*Hell.* 4.3.11). He gives no numbers for these divisions but clearly states that the Hellenic alone outnumbered the entire Peloponnesian fleet (*Hell.* 4.3.12), which numbered 85 according to Diodorus (14.83.5).² That the nucleus of the Hellenic division was Cypriot is clearly implied by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (= P), especially with Bruce's attractive restorations,³ and is directly claimed by Isocrates (*Evag.* 67, 83), who even puts Evagoras personally in the battle of Cnidus. According to P some of the Cyprians were in revolt in 395, led by a Carpasian, but that insurrection was brutally suppressed by Conon. In August 394 Conon and Pharnabazus defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. Conon commanded the front line of Greek squadrons, Pharnabazus brought up the rear (*Xen. Hell.* 4.3.11). Diodorus (14.83.4) gives Conon and Pharnabazus "more than 90 trieremes." In the next year the entire Persian fleet with Conon and Pharnabazus in some sort of joint command operated off the Spartan coast and Conon put in at Athens with money for the rebuilding of the long walls, restoring Athenian dreams of maritime power (Diod. 14.84.3-5; *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.8-10).

This means that the earliest conceivable date for Evagoras to have contemplated any independent naval action is winter 393/2. He had been Conon's friend since 405, giving him refuge after the debacle at Aegospotami. He had helped secure Conon his command of part of the Persian fleet, and its operations until 393 would have been impossible without his full support. In 396/5 it had been based at Caunus. At that time, all waters to the west of that harbour were hostile, and without secure support from the

²In 395 Agesilaus had ordered a fleet of 120 new ships (*Xen. Hell.* 3.4.28; see also Diod. 14.79.4).

³I. A. F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia"* (Cambridge 1967) 130.

east its position would have been untenable. Much the same must be said for the fleet's operations in 393. The Cyprian contingents must still have been present, and prolonged operations off the Greek mainland would have been unthinkable had there been the merest rumour of a possible Cyprian revolt.

It is useful to reflect upon the politics of the command of the Persian fleet in the years surrounding Cnidus. After Aegospotami Conon had fled to Evagoras, who befriended him and eventually sponsored him as a likely commander of the Greek units in the King's fleet. By nominating a senior commander of the fleet, Evagoras would have a major stake in the operation's success. He would be obliged to support it with all his resources. For his part Conon was an exiled Athenian, whose need of a powerful friend in Persia and a host like Evagoras was greater because he was an exile. The vulnerability of these two Greeks goes a long way to explain the bold sea operations of Pharnabazus in 394 and 393, relying heavily as he was on Greek units.

By 392, however, the picture had suddenly changed. Antalcidas went to Sardis and persuaded Tiribazus to arrest Conon on the grounds that he was using the King's forces to restore Athenian maritime power. Conon's disgrace would raise suspicions about Evagoras, who must have received his forces back from Conon at the end of the campaigning season of 393. In addition the Phoenician contingents (mostly Tyrian one would suppose) must have returned home. This is important, for it sets the scene for the outbreak of Evagoras' revolt.⁴

The next thing we hear is that Evagoras is attempting to conquer the entire island of Cyprus (Diod. 14.98.1-2). Perhaps he had been laying plans for this, but actual operations would seem unlikely before the recovery of the Cyprian units from Conon's fleet. The possession of a victorious, experienced fleet that had been drilled by an accomplished commander like Conon would inflame any man ambitious for conquest, and Evagoras probably thought that the King owed him a favour by now and would turn a blind eye to his territorial ambitions. Perhaps the cries of the three assaulted Cyprian towns (Amathus, Soli, and Citium) would have gone unheard had it not been for Tiribazus and the influential Antalcidas. Somehow their complaints were brought to the ears of the King and he decided in their favour. Evagoras probably started campaigning in spring 392.⁵

⁴See E. A. Costa, Jr., "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca 411 to 391 B.C.," *Historia* 23 (1974) 40-56 (hereafter = Costa), for a full discussion of the events leading up to the revolt.

⁵Costa (53) suggests "perhaps as early as 393," but it is hard to imagine what he could do until his fleet returned from the Greek mainland late in 393. Some of it would need maintenance and refitting over the winter.

Persia's main objective through the mid to late 390s was the recovery of Egypt.⁶ This explains the Persians' reluctance to press their advantage in the Aegean gained by the victory at Cnidus. For the time being the Greeks could be left to squabble among themselves. The loss of Cyprus was a serious setback, however, and after the failure of Hecatomnus to recover the island in 389 a much more ambitious plan became necessary: a two-pronged assault on Cyprus and Egypt to prevent each from aiding the other (see below, 9-10). In the age of pre-mechanized warfare the main principles of the application of force in the triangle formed by a line from Egypt to Phoenicia to Pisidia were simple: they inevitably involved Cyprus. If strategy is the science of applying superior force, Cyprus was vulnerable to a united coast stretching from Egypt to Pisidia; conversely Cyprus could be used as a base for concentrating forces with which to launch an attack on the mainland opposite. Moreover, a strong and secure alliance of Cyprus and Tyre would be a most effective deterrent against an invasion of Egypt from the north, while, again, disorder along the northern line of the triangle from Tyre past Cyprus to Pisidia invited aggression from the south.

These strategic principles are easily illustrated from history. In the fifth century the Egyptians had made the mistake of revolting while Phoenicia remained loyal and Cyprus was divided at best. Nonetheless, the arrival of Athenian naval support from Cyprus resulted in serious losses to the Persian cause. It took a second invasion commanded by Megabyzus son of Zopyrus with full Phoenician support to restore the Persian position (Thuc. 1.104, 109-110). Later, in about 411, Tissaphernes brought the entire Phoenician fleet of 147 ships into the Aegean to support Sparta against Athens (Thuc. 8.87.3). It was quickly dismissed, however, and returned home (Thuc. 8.108; Diod. 13.38.4-5). Later the Persians explained to the annoyed Spartans that Persia feared damage from a possible Egyptian-Arabian alliance unless the Phoenician fleet were present in force to stabilize the region (Diod. 13.46.6).⁷ Alexander the Great also exploited the strategic possibilities of the triangle. After his capture of Asia Minor (332) the next critical step was the reduction of Tyre. The daring Alexander would bypass and isolate Cyprus, but would not skirt Tyre and Cyprus to invade Egypt. Instead he poured time, money, and men into the capture of Tyre. Cyprian support proved decisive when it finally came. With Tyre

⁶In 401 the Phoenician satrap, Abrocomas, who later shared the command of Pharnabazus' attack on Acoris, was in command of a large army, reportedly 300,000 men (Xen. An. 1.4.5). Whether or not we believe the figure, the presence of a substantial army in Phoenicia in 401 must mean that an invasion of Egypt was in advanced stages of preparation. The force was drawn off by Cyrus' invasion. H. R. Hall (CAH 6 [Cambridge 1927] 145) considers the main purpose of assembling the armada under Pharnabazus and Conon that fought Cnidus was an ultimate assault on Egypt.

⁷D. M. Lewis, "The Phoenician Fleet in 411," *Historia* 7 (1958) 392-397.

and Cyprus in the fold Egypt capitulated to Alexander without a struggle. Then, with the entire triangle and Cyprus in his pocket he could afford a "holiday" to Siwah, knowing that Darius would not be attacking him from the rear.⁸ Much later, the Crusaders knew that the concentration of superior force on Cyprus could give them access to any part of the triangle. Cyprus was regularly used as a staging point for crusading activity in the area. They used it as a supply dump on at least one occasion, as Artaxerxes Ochus may have done when he finally invaded and took Egypt in the 340s B.C.⁹

The chronology of the assault on Egypt and of the other events of the decade 390–380 is invariably based on the belief that Pharnabazus' attack on Egypt preceded the battle of Citium, as Isocrates seems to imply. The dates that have been proposed are (1) ca 389–387 for the assault on Egypt, followed by Citium in 386, or (2) ca 385–383 for the former, with Citium in 383 or ca 382/1.¹⁰ On either view the defeat of the Egyptian campaign by Persia could be seen as a cause of the revolt of Cilicia (Isoc. *Paneg.* 161) and other parts of the coast like Pisidia (Theopompus 115 F 103.13) in support of Evagoras. It would follow from this that Evagoras began his revolt in virtual isolation. Indeed, Diodorus seems to lend support to that notion by narrating the alliance with Egypt and Tyre in the archon year 386/5. In other words, Evagoras decided to commit himself to a revolt in ca 390 with no demonstration of support from Egypt, and with Tyre still in the Persian

⁸I find it difficult to agree with A. B. Bosworth's assessment (*Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* [Cambridge 1988] 65) that the siege of Tyre was strategically unnecessary. Bosworth's own account of Alexander's entry into a welcoming Egypt (including the siege of Gaza) shows clearly the need for maritime support; and the vulnerability of any invading army from the seaward flank is obvious.

⁹Richard Lionheart's first move in 1191 was to take Cyprus: E. Chapin Furber, "The Kingdom of Cyprus 1191–1291," in R. L. Wolff and H. W. Hazard, eds., *A History of the Crusades* 2 (Madison, Milwaukee, and London 1969) 599–629, esp. 602; see also E. R. A. Sewter, tr., *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena* (Harmondsworth 1969) 362 ff.; for the stockpiling of food supplies on Cyprus preparatory to an Egyptian invasion in 1248, see M. R. B. Shaw, tr., *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades* (Harmondsworth 1963) 197, and compare Theopompus F 263, where the location is not specified, but Cyprus is most likely; Peter I raided and captured Alexandria from Cyprus in 1365 A.D.: see Peter W. Edbury, "The Crusading Policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359–1369," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades* (Warminster 1977) 90–105. I am grateful to my student, Richard Ross, for these references. Artaxerxes' supply dumps are described by Theopompus (F 263). He does not locate them, but Cyprus and Phoenicia are obvious places for amassing cargoes bound for Egypt or southern Palestine. However, Phoenicia was not recaptured until immediately before the invasion (Diod. 16.46.4), but most of Cyprus (except a besieged Salamis) was recovered somewhat sooner (Diod. 16.42).

¹⁰For the earlier dates: Judeich, Ruzicka, and Stylianou; for the later ones: Beloch, Meyer, and most others since.

camp. His only ally was an enfeebled Athens, whose ability to reach him with help was largely neutralized by still active remnants of the shattered Spartan thalassocracy.

If we were to accept Isocrates' claim (*Evag.* 71, 73–74) that Evagoras' "revolt" was nothing more than a response to unprovoked aggression by the Persian King, we would be tempted to read into the King's decision an expectation that he had sufficient strength to crush Evagoras before he became too strong. Presumably he had the Phoenician fleet to the east of Cyprus, and Hecatomnus of Caria and the coastal cities were building another fleet to the west. Evagoras did not even possess the entire island of Cyprus. Three coastal cities, Amathus, Soli, and nearby Citium, were hostile to him. Now Artaxerxes had a record of being conciliatory to rebellious minions who sued for terms (*Diod.* 14.34), and if Evagoras' position had been truly desperate in ca 390, it is surprising that he did not explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement at that time, as he eventually did toward the end of the decade (*Diod.* 15.9.1–2). A more detailed estimate of the resources of the opposing forces helps to illuminate the strategic decisions of the major players.

In 393 Persia still had the Phoenician fleet. Some of it had been at Cnidus (*Paus.* 1.3.2), presumably under Pharnabazus, but its size at this time is not recorded. In 401 there had been massive military buildup in Phoenicia, probably in preparation for an invasion of Egypt. Xenophon (*An.* 1.4.5) mentions 300,000 soldiers under Abrocomas, the Phoenician satrap, in that year. He does not mention a fleet, but in other cases when Greeks record Phoenicia at full levy, as she would have been under those circumstances, they assign her 300 ships.¹¹ A fleet of that size should have been able to crush Evagoras effortlessly, for he had no more than seventy ships until he gained control of Tyre, probably in ca 389 (see below, 8). However, Diodorus (11.77.1) gives the further information that the Phoenician fleet of 300 used to support the invasion of Egypt in the 450s was built from the combined resources of Phoenicia, Cyprus, and Cilicia. More particular information on the potential size of the Phoenician fleet is provided by Diodorus (14.79.5–8). The year is 396. Conon's fleet grows from forty to eighty vessels of unspecified origin and receives further reinforcement of eighty Phoenician and ten Cilician ships. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the Phoenicians had 300 ships to use against Evagoras in ca 390; eighty would probably be closer to the truth. However, Isocrates remarks (*Paneg.* 162) that the King had "counted much on Tyre," apparently until it was taken by Evagoras (see also *Isoc. Evag.* 62). This must mean that he declared war on Evagoras, relying on the Phoenicians and expecting

¹¹Hdt. 7.89; *Diod.* 11.77.1. *Thuc.* 8.87.3 makes it 147 ships in 411.

reinforcements from Hecatomnus of Caria. However, Diodorus' account of the battle of Citium makes no direct mention of the Phoenician fleet (Diod. 15.3-4.1). Its apparent failure to come to the support of Hecatomnus in 389 after he crossed to Cyprus "with a large force" (Diod. 14.98.3-4), and the inclusion of twenty Tyrian ships with Evagoras at Citium (Diod. 15.2.4) would seem to confirm Isocrates' claim that Evagoras had deprived the King of his hopes by capturing Tyre.

At Citium Evagoras had 200 ships: ninety, comprising seventy Cyprian and twenty Tyrian (Diod. 15.2.4), a further sixty apparently recent acquisitions, and fifty from his Egyptian ally (Diod. 15.3.4). Diodorus does not say how he got the extra sixty, but his capturing of Tyre in response to the King's declaration of war could conceivably have netted unmanned hulls above the twenty in his standing fleet, while the proceeds from his raid on Phoenicia (Isoc. *Evag.* 62) could have provided the money for their crews. For their part the Egyptians had gained a fleet in the year 400 thanks to Tamos, its commander, and his enmity with Tissaphernes (Diod. 14.35.2). Unwilling to offer surrender to Artaxerxes after supporting the ill-fated rebellion of Cyrus, he fled to Egypt. On arrival, he was rewarded with death by King Psammetichus, who seized his fleet and treasury (Diod. 14.35.2-5). According to Xenophon (*An.* 1.4.2) Tamos had direct command over twenty-five ships in 401, but it is not known how many he brought to Egypt in 400.¹² In 396 the Egyptians gave Sparta equipment for one hundred vessels (Diod. 14.79.4). So they must have had organization and resources for naval production. Further maritime support could have come to Acoris from Cyrene if Βαρκαίους is the correct reading at Theopompus F 103.1. In any event fifty triremes is not an impossible number for the Egyptian fleet in ca 390.¹³

Evagoras' need for 200 vessels at Citium was created by the great size of the Persian fleet (Diod. 15.3.3) and it would be helpful to identify the sources of a fleet on the Persian side presumably of similar size to Evagoras'. Persia may have lost Cilicia for a time before the battle (Isoc. *Evag.* 62), and Evagoras had Tyre and at least part of its fleet in his possession. The majority of the King's fleet, therefore, must have come from Ionia and, as Ruzicka has argued, Dascylium. The settlement of the King's Peace in 387/6 made it possible to concentrate all Persian maritime strength in the Aegean on the task of reducing Cyprus (Ruzicka 106-108).¹⁴ Significantly

¹²Lewis (141, n. 43) assumes that Tamos would have brought Cyrus' entire Ionian fleet to Egypt, "50 well-equipped vessels" (Diod. 14.19.5). This is by no means unreasonable and, indeed, seems to be what Diodorus (14.35.4-5) implies by μετὰ τοῦ στόλου.

¹³"Egypt was never short of cordage (Diod. 14.79.4) . . ." says Lewis (*ibid.*).

¹⁴I find Ruzicka's argument compelling. My difficulty with his date of 389-387 for Pharnabazus' invasion of Egypt takes nothing away from the cogency of his remaining argument.

Pharnabazus is now moved from his northwestern satrapy to receive the Egyptian command (see below, 15).

Two descriptions of the Persian responses to Egyptian rebellion illustrate what could be called the "textbook" invasion of Egypt. First, in ca 462/1 Inarus gained naval support from an Athenian fleet of 200 ships which "happened to be campaigning off Cyprus" (Thuc. 1.104), and succeeded in isolating pro-Persian forces, brilliantly at first. However, resistance persisted at the White Castle and the King sent in a "large" relieving expedition under Megabyzus (Thuc. 1.109). It was supported by the Phoenician fleet (Thuc. 1.110), which trapped and defeated a fifty-ship squadron of reinforcements from Athens.¹⁵ If Ctesias' figures are of any use, they may be taken to support the assumption that the regular navy from Phoenicia proper comprised eighty ships. The larger number of 300, if reliable, must have included levies from places other than Phoenicia. Second, Perdiccas invaded Ptolemy's Egypt in 321 with Attalus commanding his supporting fleet (Diod. 18.41.7). He even detached a force for a simultaneous invasion of Cyprus.¹⁶ Thus, the "textbook" invasion of Egypt from the north called for a land army marching down the Palestine corridor heavily dependent on a fleet not only for supplies but also for protection on its right flank. Engels has shown how completely an army in southern Palestine must rely for its very survival on food and water brought in regularly by sea.¹⁷ The classic resistance was to hinder the progress of the invading army, especially near the Nile, to allow the river's unpredictable flow, treacherous mud, and man-eating crocodiles time to take their toll in manpower and morale (Diod. 18.35-36), and to call in allies from the Mediterranean to snip the aggressor's maritime umbilical cord. Therefore, to move an army through Palestine in the 380s when there was

¹⁵ Apparently Ctesias' description of this incident was more circumstantial, if Photius' summary of it is to be trusted (*FGrHist.* 688 F 14.32-36 = Phot. *Bibl.* 72, pp. 40a-41b). In Ctesias the first invasion under Achaemenes enjoyed the support of eighty Phoenician vessels, while the second, under Megabyzus, was supported by "300 ships" of unspecified origin. If Ctesias' figures are of any use, they may be taken to support the assumption that the regular navy from Phoenicia proper comprised eighty ships. The larger number of 300, if reliable, must have included levies from places other than Phoenicia. The figures provided by Ctesias are evaluated with healthy scepticism by J. M. Bigwood, "Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus," *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 10-16.

¹⁶ On the invasion of Cyprus, and in general, see A. B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation* (Oxford 1988) 198-199. See also Diod. 16.40-44 (the reduction of Egypt in 344/3). The King raises a force of 300,000 foot, 30,000 cavalry, and 300 ships (16.40.6). He calls in Idraeus the Carian to subdue a Cyprian rebellion, who proceeds with more success than Hecatomnus had previously (16.42.6-9). Next the King moves against and subdues a rebellion in Phoenicia before finally attacking Egypt.

¹⁷ D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1978) 55-61.

a fleet of 70–90 vessels, which could be increased at a pinch to 150, ready to harass it from the rear, and when the Egyptians themselves were in possession of a further 50 ships (or more) at the front, would be to run an insane risk. If it should be that Tyre and the bulk of the Phoenician fleet were also lost to the invaders, the restoration of maritime control—that is, the reduction, or at least neutralization, of Evagoras—would be an unavoidable preliminary.

Nevertheless, most scholars since Judeich have arranged the chronology of the events with Egypt first and Cyprus second. The evidence is literary. Diodorus says that the Cyprian war lasted for nearly ten years, that the greater part of the time was spent in preparations, and that there were only two years of continuous warfare (15.9.2). The problem is that he narrates this for the year 385/4, and the war seems to have broken out not “nearly ten” but a mere five or six years before 385/4 in ca 390. Despite the problems with Diodorus’ narrative Judeich accepted his date of 386 for Citium and used Isocrates (*Paneg.* 140–141) to date Pharnabazus’ invasion of Egypt to 389–387. Meyer, however, found a reference in Xenophon that, he felt, put Pharnabazus in his satrapy at that time. Since then, the structure of his and Beloch’s chronology has won wide acceptance. With minor variations in dates it puts Citium and then the two years of continuous fighting referred to by Diodorus at or near the end of the decade; the invasion is then placed between Citium and the King’s Peace. The logic looks compelling. Since the war began in ca 390 and lasted nearly ten years, it must have ended in about 380, a date confirmed by Theopompus (F 103.10), who puts Evagoras’ capitulation after Nectenibis’ accession, datable to about 380 or a little before. However, Diodorus narrates two years of continuous fighting beginning with Citium and ending in Evagoras’ surrender (15.9.2). Citium, therefore, must really be dated to two years before ca 380 and not to 387/6. Diodorus put the event in the wrong archon year. Furthermore, Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* speaks in 380 of a “three years’ war” in Egypt that had ended in disaster for the Persians. If it lasted a full three years and Citium had been but two years previous, it must have begun before that battle. But more significantly Isocrates speaks of this war first, introducing it with *πρῶτον μὲν*, then turns to the Cyprian War with *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*. This certainly seems to say that the entire Egyptian campaign was finished before the King turned on Evagoras.

Isocrates’ purpose in this section of the *Panegyricus* is to prove that the Greek impressions of the strength of the Great King are exaggerated. He argues that the King has succeeded now against Athens, now against Sparta because he was allied in each case with the other Greek power (139), and wonders how he has fared when fighting (alone) for himself (*ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ*)?

First (πρῶτον μὲν) since Egypt revolted (ἀποστάσης Αἰγύπτου) how has he done against its rulers? Did he not send . . . Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus who remained there for three years and suffered more evil than they inflicted? They ended by withdrawing so ignominiously that the rebels are no longer just delighted with their freedom but are already aiming to rule their neighbours. Next he campaigned against Evagoras (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐπ' Εὐαγοράν στρατεύσας). He rules but a single city . . . He occupies an island and has been defeated at sea . . .

Isocrates goes on to claim (*ibid.*) that Evagoras is holding out with a mere three thousand light infantry, but still the King cannot defeat him (οὐ δύναται περιγενέσθαι βασιλεὺς πολέμων), "but has now wasted six years in the attempt."

This last remark is an obvious problem. In 380 the King had wasted ten years, not six, in trying to bring Evagoras to heel. Perhaps this passage was written in 384 and not revised at the time of publication. There is other evidence that the speech was put together piecemeal over a few years and imperfectly revised (Reid 141-142). But the idea that Isocrates would neglect to change a number six to a ten and so miss an opportunity to enhance the rhetorical impact of his argument (for ten years lost on Evagoras instead of six would not only sound more impressive but would actually be true in 380) is too much to credit. And there is another way in which Isocrates' rhetoric seems out of harmony with the chronology of Beloch. If Beloch's reconstruction is correct, the King has been far from sluggish on Cyprus in the past two years. His forces had beaten Evagoras at Citium, driven him from the rest of Cyprus, and bottled him up in Salamis so effectively that he was now negotiating surrender. This is a lot to ignore, and I wonder how the orator expected his audience in 380, most of whom must have been alarmed by the King's sudden show of power, to accept an argument against which there were so many obvious objections.

I prefer to suggest that Isocrates is using public knowledge that the Persians had begun open aggression on Cyprus six years previously to build his rhetorical point. News of Evagoras' defeat at Citium must have sent a shock wave through the Greek world. Everyone must have expected his quick capitulation. Six years had gone by since then, however, and Evagoras had not capitulated. Greek fear of Persian military effectiveness could now be turned to derision in 380 by a skilful orator. I take this passage, therefore, as confirmation of Diodorus' date of 386 for the battle of Citium.

Isocrates' information is equivocal since it can be read to support conflicting chronologies. Before discussing fully my own understanding of Isocrates (*Paneg.* 140-141), I should like to consider some other literary evidence, which, I hope, will make the real sequence of events more clear. Theopompus gave a full account of the revolt in his *Philippica*. That work is sadly

lost, but the fragments show that he began a digression of seven to eight books on the eastern Greeks and their interactions with Persia and Egypt in Book 12, leaving his main subject, the career of Philip II, unmentioned, it would seem, for an extended period. The digression began in the late 390s and covered about 50 years ending with Artaxerxes Ochus' reduction of Egypt in 344/3. In Byzantine times there had been some debate concerning the survival of Book 12. Fortunately Photius had read it and gives a precious summary of its contents in point form to prove that he had. I translate the relevant portion (Phot. *Bibl.* 176, p. 120a = F 103):

1) The twelfth book contains . . . ; 4) how the King was persuaded to make war on Evagoras, appointing Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, to the generalship, and Hecatomnus to the command of the fleet; 5) concerning the peace that he arbitrated for the Hellenes; 6) how he began to make war more vigorously against Evagoras, and about the sea-fight at Cyprus; 7) how the city of the Athenians tried to abide by the agreement with the King, but the Lacedaemonians presumptuously transgressed its terms; 8) in what manner they established the Peace of Antalcidas; 9) how Tiribazus made war, how he plotted against Evagoras, and how Evagoras denounced him to the King and got him arrested with the complicity of Orontes; 10) how Evagoras sent ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians after Nectenibis had ascended to the Egyptian throne; 11) in what way the war over Cyprus was settled for (by?) him.

A few remarks will help bring this information into focus. The appointment of Hecatomnus as commander of the fleet agrees with Diodorus (Diod. 14.98.3), who, however, makes no mention of Autophradates. Apparently Theopompus said nothing worth summarizing about the accomplishments of these two commanders once they had crossed to Cyprus, and that too agrees with Diodorus.¹⁸ Section 5 brings us to the King's Peace and so far the order is chronological. The next few sections are also ordered that way in my belief, but not according to Milns and Ellis.¹⁹ The problem is that the Peace of Antalcidas in 8 is the same as the peace mentioned in Section 5. Is Section 8 out of order, therefore? It certainly looks odd to have Athens and Sparta in Section 7 abiding by, or breaking the terms of, an agreement that they will not put in place until Section 8. The question will receive further discussion below (13–14), but first I should like to complete my general remarks about the fragment. The "sea fight at Cyprus" in Section 6 must be Citium, and it looks as if Theopompus narrated that battle as a direct and immediate consequence of the King's settlement in Section 5. Tiribazus

¹⁸It looks from Section 9 as if the first two Persian commanders were relieved of their appointments. Hecatomnus at least did not die in 389. He was still alive when Isocrates wrote the *Panegyricus* (see *Paneg.* 162). His death was probably in 377/6 when Mausolus ascended the Carian throne (Diod. 16.36.2). See Simon Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 35–38.

¹⁹R. D. Milns and J. R. Ellis, "Theopompus, Fragment 103 Jacoby," *Parola del Passato* 21 (1966) 56–60.

and Orontes in Section 9 are identified for us by Diodorus (15.8–9) as the (new) joint commanders of the Cyprian war. M. Osborne²⁰ has shown how bad their relationship had been before this (discussed below, 16–17) and it appears that Evagoras exploited their mutual distrust to buy time, prolonging the siege. The arrival of Evagoras' ambassadors to Sparta in Section 10 requesting aid and, no doubt, spreading circumstantial but slanted reports of the King's failures in Egypt and alleged ineffectiveness on Cyprus probably provided information for Isocrates' *Panegyricus* and an ideal occasion for its (too hasty?) publication.

Is Theopompus F 103.5–8 in precise chronological order? If we set aside the contentious issue of Citium in Section 6, the rest corresponds with Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.30–33), which is clearly chronological.²¹ By way of introduction Xenophon reports that the Athenians were eager for peace in 387 (5.1.29), fearing the new alliance between Antalcidas and Tiribazus. So too were the Argives, and the Spartans were “fed up with the war” themselves (5.1.30). Accordingly Tiribazus called them together and read them the King's terms. He demanded the coastal cities of Ionia, and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus. He also decreed autonomy for the other Greek cities. This must have been in late 387, and from this date a historian like Theopompus could regard the Greeks as having an unratified agreement with the King, the clearly expressed provisions of which could be treated with respect or manipulated. Xenophon does not say, but it appears that the Athenians respected the Persian claim to Clazomenae. Earlier this same year they had been exercising control over the island and collecting a 5 per cent tax from it.²² Upon Tiribazus' announcement the Clazomeneans probably ceased payment and the Athenians would have had no recourse but quiet acquiescence. For their part the Spartans imposed a harsh interpretation of the autonomy clause on the Thebans even before anyone had ratified the agreement. First the Thebans resisted, but Agesilaus began to raise an army. It was still assembling at Tegea when the Theban ambassadors arrived to report a change of resolve. Apparently we have now reached the early campaigning season of 386. Next Agesilaus dismantled the sympolity of Corinth and Argos. Xenophon passes over the reassembling of the representatives to take the oaths, but proceeds immediately to the ratification of the agreement that he now calls the Peace of Antalcidas.

²⁰Michael J. Osborne, “Orontes,” *Historia* 22 (1973) 515–551, especially 528–537.

²¹Xenophon is not a whimsical choice. Porphyry (in Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* 10, p. 465 b–c = *FGrHist* 115 F 21) identifies heavy borrowing from Xenophon's *Hellenica* in Theopompus' work of the same name. There is nothing against his continued use of Xenophon in the *Philippica*. Indeed, Thrasydaeus of Elis (F 103.12) was introduced into the historical record by Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.23–31). It looks to me as if Theopompus exploited and supplemented Xenophon's record in this part of the *Philippica*.

²²Tod, *GHI* 114 = *SIG*³ 136. See Ruzicka 107.

Theopompus follows Xenophon's chronological order, adding the detail that the Athenians withdrew from the Aegean in voluntary compliance with their "agreement with the King"; this was of special interest to a historian whose home, Chios, was in the Aegean and of relevance to his subject: Persian preparations for the battle of Citium. The presence of *ὑπέρογκα φρονούντες* ("presumptuously") in Section 7 of Photius suggests that Theopompus did not approve of Sparta's interpretation of the autonomy clause in the dealings between the time of Tiribazus' announcement and the Greeks' final establishment of the Peace of Antalcidas. The order of Theopompus F 103.4–9 is chronological, therefore, and his date for Citium was sometime between late 387 and early 386. This means that F 103.6, far from being out of place, is better seen as an epitome of Theopompus' explanation of the King's objective in imposing the Peace at this time: to clear the way for a concentration of his forces on the eastern Mediterranean. The Hellenocentric mind of the historian prompts him to describe the war as one "against Evagoras" when in truth the prime target was Egypt. Apparently, Diodorus found a similar comment in Ephorus. He reports (14.110.5) that "the dispute with the Greeks resolved (i.e., thanks to the King's Peace), the King began to make ready his forces for the Cyprian War." The next sentence introduces the strength of Evagoras' position: "he had acquired just about the whole of Cyprus while Artaxerxes was 'distracted' (literally 'scattered') by his war with the Greeks." There follows a long interruption for Dionysius' siege of Rhegium, but, when we return to the Cyprian War, the subject is the King's preparations (15.2.2), the strength and resources of Evagoras (15.2.3–4), and the battle of Citium (15.2.4–6). The flow of the interrupted narrative is unmistakable and the only possible indication that there could have been a lapse of time between the King's Peace and Citium is 15.2.1, where we are told that the King "was (or, had been) busy with his preparations for a long time." However, the preparations had begun in ca 390 (Diod. 15.9.2.). These included the declaration of war, the instructions to the coastal cities to build a fleet, the appointments of Hecatomnus and Autophradates, and the decision to make Pharnabazus the King's son-in-law and give him the Egyptian command with the expectation that he would contribute at least to the navy. They culminated in the negotiation of the King's Peace. The Peace included the specific demand for Clazomenae to guarantee Artaxerxes' control of the Gulf of Smyrna, in which the Persians had traditionally assembled their Aegean fleet (Ruzicka 104–105, 107–108). The fleet could have been assembled in 387 and been under way for Cyprus by the opening of the campaigning season of 386. I take this to be the implication of Diod. 4.110.5 and Theopompus F 103.6. It follows that Citium was fought in 386.

One other piece of evidence deserves consideration before I attempt a final synthesis. Justin 6.6 preserves an account of the beginnings of the

Egyptian assault: after Cnidus and the restoration of Athens Artaxerxes organized a peace among the Greeks because he was planning an invasion of Egypt and wished to withdraw his forces from the Aegean to concentrate on that target. This passage confirms the existence of a tradition that made the King's Peace part of a larger Persian strategy aimed at the reduction of Egypt. In this version the attack on Egypt follows 387 and must, therefore, be after, or synchronous with, the attempted reduction of Cyprus.

Of course it must be admitted that Justin is not the best source for chronological information. A minority view that the Egyptian invasion must date to 389–387 (or thereabouts) persists among modern scholars. Despite my arguments based on strategic considerations this date looks highly defensible on the basis of our sources until one inquires into the actual whereabouts of Pharnabazus, the expedition's supreme commander. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.33) places him in his Hellespontine satrapy, apparently during the campaigning season of 389. Therefore, he must have made very great haste indeed to get from Phrygia to Phoenicia, assume the reins of command, and mobilize for Egypt all in one year. But, unless he does, there will be insufficient time for Isocrates' "three-year war" before the announcement of the King's Peace by Tiribazus in 387. Indeed, there simply does not seem to be sufficient time, for, if we believe Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.28), Pharnabazus was in Susa marrying the King's daughter, while Tiribazus was settling the Greek business in 387. The arrangements for marriage to a king's daughter would require more than a few weeks; the marriage itself is scarcely an honour to be bestowed on a defeated general. This is a promotion for which Pharnabazus had been negotiating for about a decade.²³ The Egyptian campaign belongs after the King's Peace, as Justin states, and would be led by a royal son-in-law.

If the sources have been interpreted correctly and Citium was fought in 386, then four years of inactivity on Cyprus from ca 384 to ca 380 need to be explained. My reconstruction requires the placement of Diodorus' two years of fighting to the years 386–384. After that, the war was effectively over. However, Evagoras still had to negotiate his return to the Persian empire, and I suggest that he found ways of protracting the negotiations. In particular he plotted the arrest of Tiribazus with the aid of Orontes. Details come from Ephorus through Diodorus' not-too-careful epitome. After Orontes and Tiribazus brought their fleet from near Phocaea and Cyme to Cilicia, Diodorus reports the involvement of Acoris and adds that Hecatomnus was sending money secretly (15.2.3–3.3). In addition, Tyre and much of Phoenicia were with the rebels. The support from

²³In 396/5 it had been the reason for Spithridates' support of Agesilaus, for Spithridates had apparently given his daughter to Pharnabazus, and, when Pharnabazus began negotiating with the King, he took offense, expecting that his daughter would simply be used as Pharnabazus' concubine (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10, Ages. 3.3.1).

Acoris was very heavy, involving grain, money, and ships. With this support Evagoras nearly deprived the Persians of their base at Citium, but they won the crucial sea fight and began the preparations for the siege of Salamis. Besieged, Evagoras left his son Pnytagoras in charge and slipped off to Egypt in search of further support (15.4.3). In 385/4 (Diod. 15.8) Evagoras returned from Egypt with less money than expected. In my view Acoris was fighting (or expecting?) Pharnabazus, and would feel less generous as a result. Evagoras began negotiating surrender with Tiribazus, the terms of which were harsh. In jealousy Orontes denounced Tiribazus to Artaxerxes, who wrote back with instructions to arrest him. Tiribazus asked for a trial and the King agreed, but postponed it because he was involved in a war with the Cadusians. On Cyprus the morale of the Persian army collapsed and Evagoras negotiated generous terms of surrender with Orontes, all in 385/4. Diodorus is confused here. The final settlement of the war was another four years off, and cannot have involved Orontes (see below). For his part Theopompus' narrative requires the cooperation of Orontes and Evagoras in the denunciation of Tiribazus. This would require a truce that must have been negotiated in early 384. However, the final settlement of Cyprus would scarcely be handed down until after the trial of Tiribazus. The period of low morale must belong to the long inactive wait while the King was on campaign near the Caspian Sea.

In his study of Orontes, Osborne does not accept Diodorus' date for Citium, but puts the battle in ca 383 (above, note 20). On the subject of the rivalry between Orontes and Tiribazus, Osborne suggests that it goes back to a period when Tiribazus was satrap of Armenia and Orontes was under him in that satrapy. Osborne follows Theopompus' account of the denunciation of Tiribazus: the principal calumniator was Evagoras, not Orontes (F 103.9), contrary to Ephorus in Diodorus, who seems to know nothing of an involvement by Evagoras. The reason for this argument is that Osborne must have Orontes press the siege to a quick conclusion after the arrest of Tiribazus; for, if the battle of Citium took place in 383, Tiribazus would have been arrested in ca 381 and the war must have ended by 381/0 after "two years of fighting." So Orontes is clearly wasting little time. But, if Orontes needed Evagoras' support in his prosecution of Tiribazus, his apparent aggressiveness against a witness whose cooperation he needs is puzzling. We must not forget that Orontes was risking the King's wrath should he be found a false accuser of a loyal servant. He would scarcely have wanted to jeopardize his case by alienating his star witness.

However, I am unable to agree with Osborne on this point. As things turned out, the King seems to have had little doubt who Tiribazus' chief calumniator was. After the acquittal Artaxerxes is reported to have struck Orontes from his list of friends and placed him in utmost ignominy (Diod.

15.11.2), but Evagoras was treated with impressive mildness. He was permitted to re-enter the Persian empire and to submit to Artaxerxes without penalty "as king to King" (Diod. 15.9.2). Moreover, Osborne does not give any reason why Artaxerxes would have taken seriously the otherwise totally unsupported charges of a rebellious Evagoras against one of his most respected senior administrators. Orontes was clearly the main prosecutor, and, if we follow Theopompus, we must discount somewhat his exaggerated claim about the extent and importance of Evagoras' part in the denunciation (or regard it as Photius' distortion). However, there is no call to go to the extreme of doubting his claim of collaboration between Orontes and Evagoras, for that is the clue to understanding Diodorus' confusion about the war's termination. In order to prosecute Tiribazus together, Evagoras and Orontes must have reached an understanding. Evagoras would help overthrow Tiribazus in exchange for leniency (or some such thing). While the trial was pending or under way, the "war" would be put on hold. This effectively was the end of the Cypriot war, for there would be no more real fighting, only about three or four years of waiting for the trial's outcome, followed by Evagoras' negotiated capitulation ten years after the declaration of hostilities.

To the objection that two rounds of negotiations and a trial is scarcely enough to fill four years there is no easy answer. I venture to offer the following tentative schedule to show how the time could have been consumed. If Diodorus' two years' fighting is to be trusted, then Evagoras offered conditional surrender two years after Citium, early in 384 by my chronology (Diod. 15.8.1-2). However, negotiations between Evagoras and Tiribazus broke down on the final condition that Evagoras should submit as slave to master. Now suspicions began to be aroused as embassies kept shuttling back and forth (Diod. 15.8.4). Orontes complained about the delays in a letter to the King. A return dispatch ordered Tiribazus' arrest and transportation to the King. The King, however, was distracted by his expedition against the Cadusians near the Caspian sea and so delayed Tiribazus' requested trial, keeping him "under guard." This account suggests inordinate delays in the negotiating process, and after the exchange of communications it could easily have been late 384 before Tiribazus was in the King's presence at Susa or in the field with the army. The precise date of the campaign is not known, but Plutarch (*Artax.* 24) obviously believed that Tiribazus went on it with Artaxerxes. Tiribazus' reported behaviour was that of a man anxious to prove his loyalty and he was clearly under suspicion (24.4-5), but Plutarch seems ignorant of the Cyprian affair. The Persian army encountered such severe food shortages that they ate their horses (24.2); this probably means they wintered in the field. If this was the winter of 384/3, then Tiribazus' exoneration and Orontes' fall could have taken place in early 383. A new negotiator would now have to replace

Orontes and talks with Evagoras would have to be reopened. If Theopompus is right and Orontes and Evagoras were cooperating, then the siege (if that is still the right word) would scarcely have been maintained with much diligence and Evagoras probably had opportunities to restock his provisions. More importantly, by 383 the Egyptians would have been gaining the upper hand over the Persian invaders, if they had not won completely, and Evagoras would now be negotiating from a better position. It would be in his interest to hold out as long as possible in the hope that aid might come from nearby Egypt or that some Greek state might dare take advantage of the King's reverses. Lest this seem too fanciful, it should be remembered that the Persian position deteriorated gravely when Tiribazus was removed from Cyprus. As part of his narrative for 385/4 Diodorus tells us that Glos, Tiribazus' son-in-law and admiral, revolted from the King, apparently taking with him all, or a substantial part, of the Persian fleet that had won at Citium (15.9.3-5). He formed alliances with Acoris and the Spartans, who began to think again of empire, as the story goes. However, it seems that his activities were cut short by assassination in 383/2 when the Spartans again renounced their Asiatic pretensions (15.18-19.1). It is impossible to know how much physical relief Glos provided Evagoras, if any at all, but his revolt must have stiffened Cyprian resolve considerably.

Before Evagoras' submission and after Nectenibis' succession (whenever that was, precisely) Theopompus says that Cyprian ambassadors came to Sparta, begging for help, one supposes. Perhaps Evagoras chose Sparta because of her recent willingness to support Glos. The ambassadors' message must have been simple. The Persian show of strength had come to nought. Pharnabazus had lost in Egypt and Evagoras was still holding out after six years. This, at any rate, is the cry taken up and turned into rhetoric by Isocrates.

Regardless of the chronology the argument of Isocrates (see above, 10-11) is arranged climactically. Therefore, perhaps *πρῶτον μὲν . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* is rhetorical or logical order and not temporal. The King fought a large, resourceful country like Egypt and withdrew in defeat after three years, but he is still fighting a lone Greek city and after six years seems unable to take it. Against Greeks he is a paper tiger. Even if *πρῶτον μὲν . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* is chronological, it is possible to argue that *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* refers to the ἀποστάσης Αἰγύπτου which preceded Evagoras' revolt by some 12 years. However, I should prefer to suggest that the passage is repeated under the influence of reports from Evagoras' own ambassadors to Sparta newly arrived in ca 381/0. The passage was written from the vantage-point of that year looking into the past: fighting on Cyprus had started with Citium and its preliminaries in 386 and was still proceeding six years later (by inclusive reckoning—Isocrates felt no need to mention the cooperation between

Evagoras and Orontes); the Egyptian campaign, however, was history; it had ended some three (or four?) years previously and was, therefore, a thing of the past, unlike the Cyprian struggle; only its aftermath was still being felt. The fact that the Cyprian campaign actually began first (by a few months?) is a nice point that is easily lost and need not detain an orator. Of interest is the detailed information about the size and nature of the force defending Salamis and the names of the Persian commanders. This is more than we seem to get from our literary historians and suggests autopsy (possibly by the Cyprian ambassadors). It should be noted also that the field commanders are different for the two expeditions. Ephorus and Theopompus put Tiribazus and Orontes on Cyprus. For Egypt the generals were Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus according to Isocrates. Separate field commands would be necessary if the assaults were simultaneous.

The chronological placement and interrelationship of the King's assault on Cyprus and Egypt proposed here does no more violence to any single literary source than the proposed alternatives, and less to all of them taken collectively. The late date for Citium requires drastic rearrangement of Theopompus F 103, and the further assumption that Diodorus has mislocated a major event by three years or more. My proposal requires no adjustment to Theopompus and explains Diodorus' error as resulting from an understandable confusion over the Cyprian War's two terminations, one in 384 *de facto*, after which there was no more fighting, and the other in ca 380 *de jure*, when hostilities were officially terminated. Since some correction of Diodorus is required, the assumption that he overlooked the second termination, being the least drastic, is the best by Occam's razor.²⁴ As for Isocrates, the choice is simple. If we follow the implication of *πρῶτον μὲν ... μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*, we reduce the climactic point of *Paneg.* 141 to rhetorical nonsense. This ignores Isocrates' profession. He was an orator with few pretensions as historian. So I propose to take his rhetorical point seriously and assume that carelessness is to be suspected in the meticulousness of his historical reporting.

Finally, military practices may reasonably be invoked to decide the issue since the literary sources are admittedly equivocal. The ideal procedure was the one followed by Artaxerxes Ochus in 344/3 (Diod. 16.40-46). He systematically subdued Cyprus and Phoenicia before attacking Egypt.

²⁴The alternative is more complex. It assumes that Diodorus has located too much of Ephorus' narrative in the year 386, going into material that really belongs three or four years after that date. This depends upon a further assumption that Ephorus' narrative would have left the chronological relationship of Citium to (say) the King's Peace too unclear for Diodorus to avoid the mistake. This last assumption must be maintained despite Diod. 14.110.5, which at least shows that Ephorus addressed the narrative and, hence, chronological relationship of the two events.

Less thorough would be the alternative of first defeating the rebel fleet, and then besieging its base (or bases) and simultaneously launching an assault on Egypt. I believe this to have been the sequence of events from 386 on. The rebel fleet was shattered at Citium; this provides us with a *terminus ante quem* for the beginning of Pharnabazus' invasion. Glos' rebellion, which follows Tiribazus' arrest and is placed by Diodorus in ca 383, provides a *terminus post quem* for the conclusion of Pharnabazus' three years of war. Allowance must be made for Greek inclusive reckoning—a "three-years war" does not necessarily fill three calendar years, but the chronological constraints are tight and there is nothing against the assumption that Pharnabazus began his attack on Egypt some time before the end of Diodorus' two years of fighting on Cyprus.

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